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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SHARON KNIGHT,

Case No. ~ ( [(J8{r;

Plaintiff/Appellant,

·7

vs.
DANIEL R. LEIGH,
Defendant/Respondent.:
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a personal injury action based upon the concept
of negligence in that the plaintiff/appellant, while negligently
operating her automobile in driving through an intersection in
Ogden, Utah, on October 28, 1977, caused both property damage
and personal injury to the defendant/respondent.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried in the District Court of Weber
County, the Honorable Calvin Gould presiding, sitting without
a jury, on the 4th day of December, 1979.

The court found

the appellant 100% negligent and the proximate cause of the
accident giving rise to this

suit~

denying het recovery

against the respondent and granting judgment against the
appellant and in favor of the respondent in the sum of
$7,048.55.

Said judgment included property damage and special

and general damages for personal injury.
RELIEf SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks a dismissal of

appell~nt's

appeal
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and

ari~affirmation

of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

In the early evening of October 28, 1977, appellant
was traveling south on Washington Boulevard in Ogden, Weber
County, Utah, in a 1965 Chevrolet.

She approached the

intersection of Washington Boulevard, 2nd Street and Harrisville
Road, commonly known as 5-Points.

It was appellant's intention

to execute a left hand turn from Washington Boulevard and then
travel east-bound on 2nd Street.

At approximately the same

time, respondent's vehicle was traveling north-bound on
Washington Boulevard intending to proceed through the intersection and continue north on Washington Boulevard.

As the

respondent proceeded through the intersection heading north,
appellant executed a left hand turn to go east and the vehicles
collided causing damage to both vehicles and injury to each
party.

At the trial on December 4, 1979, the appellant

testified that she was in the left turn lane behind one
other vehicle preparing to execute a left turn when the light
at the intersection>was green.

She did not see the light

turn to amber or red, but apparently, at some point, after
she observed the light was green, she began to execute her
t urn.

At th e time she executed her turn, she collided with

respondent's vehicle.

She further testified that she did not

see the respondent's vehicle until it was in the intersection,
claiming, that apparently, there was heavy traffic north-bound
on Washington Boulevard, and that he had been traveling behind
another vehicle some distance from the intersection and had
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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come out from behind that vehicle and, therefore, she did
not see him.

The respondent testified along with his

passenger, Rick Bushman, that they were traveling in the
insi4e lane of traffic going north (Washington Boulevard,
in

t~is

area, has two lanes of traffic going north and south

on each side of a divider), and that as he approached the
intersection the light was green; that as he entered the
intersection, the light turned yellow; that he did not speed
up, and that as he continued on through the intersection, he
was struck by appellant's vehicle.

The appellant called other

witnesses, Doreen Halacy and James Barnes, who were at various
places near the intersection at the time the accident occurred,
to testify about the status of the semaphore light.

Both

witnesses were confused about the sequence of the lights and,
in fact, each gave testimony
others and not accurate.

~hat

was different from the

Hal?CY testified that the light was

red for the respondent's vehicle when

h~

entered the inter-

section, but g+een for the appellant's vehicle because she
was coming from Harrisville Road and the light was green for
Harrisville Road.

This was not the case.

Witness Barnes

testified that the light was green for the south-bound
vehicles on Washington, (but red for north-bound at the same
tirne.

This was also no'J: the case.

The respondent called

Hal:-ry Moore from the State of Utah Traffic Engineer's office
wh<) testified as to the sequence of the lights at 5-Points.
The critical part of his

testimon~

was that the light was the

same for north and south-bound traffic on Washington Boulevard
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Ther~fore, if the light was green for the appellant, it was

green for the respondent.

If the light was yellow for the

appellant, it was yellow for the respondent, and red and
red, and so forth for the appellant.

The court held that the

respondent entered the intersection traveling in the through
lane of traffic nearest the center of the roadway, and that
he entered the intersection in a lawful and prudent manner
intending to proceed through the intersection traveling northbound.

That the appellant attempted a left turn at the time

that respondent's automobile was so close to the intersection,
that the automobile constituted an innnediate hazard to the
intersection.

Thata resulting collision proximately caused

injuries and damages to the respondent to the extent of $7,048.55
and that the appellant was 100% negligent.

The court found that

the testimony of Halacy and Barnes was not reliable because of
their confusion as to the sequence of the lights.

The court

entered judgment accordingly, and from that judgment, appellant
appealed and defendant/respondent now requests that the appeal
be dismissed.

ARGUMENT
DECISIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT WILL NOT BE
OVERTURNED ON APPEAL UNLESS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
AND MUST BE AFFIRMED IF SUPPORTED BY ANY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
This court has consistently enunciated its doctrine
t~

for review of trial court decisions in numerous cases.

In

Utah, the findings of the trier of fact will not be disturbed
n
on appeal unless clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious.
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Where no error of law is asserted, but only a different
view of the facts, the facts will be reviewed on appeal
in the light most favorable to susfaining the decision of
the trial court, and if there exists any substantial evidence
and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom to support the
trial court's conclusions, then the decision will not be
disturbed on appeal.

See Jensen

v~

Eddy, 30 Utah 2d 154,

514 P.2d 1142 (1953), reaffirmed in Town & Country Inn v.
M~rtin,

563 P.2d 195 (1977), and

~ore

recently Osuala v.

Olsen, case no. 16492, filed March~24, 1980.

It is abundently

clear in this case that appellant is concerned, not with any
errors of law or procedure, but has a difference of opinion
as to the trial court's factual conclusions covering responsibility for the accident.

The court should specifically

take note of the fact that the appellant·does not argue with
the judge's application of the rule

that~if the~appellant

attempted a left turn at a time when respondent's automobile
was so close to the intersection, 'that respondent's automobile constituted an innnediate hazard to the intersection,
then appellant would be the negligent party.

There was also

no disagreement by appellant that the trier of fact has
great discretion pursuant to Utah's comparative.negligence
doctrine in assessing responsibility for an
parties.

Appellant does nqt

~isagree

acc~dent

between

that in Utah in an

intersection situation, a vehicle passing through the
intersection would have the right-of-way over a vehicle
executing a turn in the intersection.

The driver going

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

·'hi

through the intersection has the right to do so wil:hout
interference from a:turning vehicle, and that vehicle is
not. allowed to proce,ed with a turn if the vehicle with
the right-of-way constitutes an immediate hazard to the
intersection.

In

e~sence,

appellant does not find fault

with the judge's application of the law to this particular
kind of accident.

What appellant seems to be saying is

that the judge should not have discounted the testimony
of the witnesses Halacy and Barnes because of certain
errors they made in the sequence.of the lights, and had he
not discounted the testimony, he could have found that the
respondent entered the intersection on a yellow or red
light and, that, therefore, the negligence of the respondent
was either equal to· or greater than that of the appellant.
It is critical to note that the appellant never argued at
any

tim~

in her brief, that the court could not have found

th•e facts as it did from the testimony adduced but, that
considering appellant's view of the testimony of Halacy,
Ba~nes

and the respondent, that the court could also find

that their testimony was reliable and that the facts indicated
th~t

the respondent's negligence was greater than appellant's.

This admission in the brief that the court could have found
for either position from the facts, in effect, renders the
appellant's position on appeal without merit.
The trial
of the witnesses.

co~rt

is the sole judge of the credibility

Both Halacy and Barnes made critical

errors in their testimony which affected their credibility.
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While both maintained that the respondent had entered the
intersection on a red light, they each indicated that the
appellant had made her turn on a green light; according
to Halacy, from Harrisville Road; according to Barnes,
from Washington Boulevard.

Appellant admits that these

statements were erroneous, but discounts their impact in
the trial.

The point is, that whether or not these particular

statements were, in and of themselves conclusive as to what
happened at that intersection, they cast

~oubt

as to the

credibility of the witnesses' statements or other observations
that they made.

While it is true that they

we+~

both indepen-

-"

dent witnesses and unknown,to each'party, they' also, as many
;:;•,I

individuals do, came upon

a

:,

l

situat!on apd observed it differently.

It is because of these kinds of problems that a trier of fact
must sit as an independent judge weighing all of the testimony
and make his independent evaluation.

Judge Gould, in this

case, evaluated the credibility of the witnesses and made
his decision that their statements. were not reliable,
particularly, when viewed in the

l~ght

(State Traffic Engineer) testimony.

of HafrY Moore's

The interesting thing

about this case is that Moore's testimony supported that of
both appellant and respondent.

That is, that the light would

be the same color for both of the parties.

If the light was

red for the appellant, it would have been red. for the respondent.
<

~.

I

'

Yellow for the appellant, yellow for the respondent, green
and green.

That it would not have been different for one

or the other.

Based upon this testimony, the impact of the
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Halacy-and Barnes statements, is even less significant.
What is apparent is:a situation where two individuals are
entering an interse6tion where the -ligh.t is changing in the
same manner for both.
is going straight.

One is making a turn and the other

It is clear that the car that is going

straight has the right-of-way under any circumstances.

It

is further clear that the person executing the turn must
not execute the turn if the automobile with the right-of-way
is so close to the intersection as·to constitute an immediate
hazard.

There is also no question from the testimony of the

appellant and respondent, that respondent's vehicle was close
enough to the intersection to constitute a hazard, regardless
of the dispute as to what color the light was.

The evidence

is in dispute concerning what the condition of the light
was when the respondent actually entered the intersection.
Discounting the Halacy and Barnes testimony, the only other
testimony bearing o~ that issue comes from the appellant
and the respondent.r The appellant states that she was in
the intersection on"a green light and turned before the
light was red.

She :;was under the semaphore light, however,

and did not see how it changed.

The respondent testified

that upon approaching the intersection, when he looked the
light was green, but that he believed it changed to yellow
as he entered the intersection.

In any event, the evidence

strongly suggests that both parties were in the intersection
on a yellow light.

At least the court could find that to be

the fact from the evidence adduced.

Even if they were both
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there on a red light, if the respondent's vehicle was close
enough to the intersection to constitute an innnediate
hazard, he still has
must yield.

t~~

right-of-way and the other car

There is abso+µtely no showing from any of
.

.

'

.

the evidence that the light changed.red
entered the intersection.

befo~e

the respondent

Had this happened, the appellant

would qave been through her turn and the accident would
never have taken,place.

What is apparent from the overall

testimony, is that an intersection accident took place with
one vehicle having the right-of-way to go straight ahead,
and another attempting to make a left turn to go through
that right-of-way path.

The court, having the ultimate

responsibility to judge the credibility of the witnesses,
what facts to accept and not accept, to make decisions as
to what to

bel~eve,

believed that the respondent

ent~red

the intersection appropriately and that he'was close enough
; .

to constitute a hazard so that the appellant should have
yielded.

Because of that finding, he prpperly assessed

100% of the negligence on the part of the appellant.
Interestingly enough, many of the ~~guments raised by the
appellant in her brief were

~ot

raised at the trial court .

..

•'

Asstnning that the court tool< all of the

:.~acts

into consideration

and giving the court's findings the prestµnptionJ'.:o
are entitled in viewing the: facts, there
the court could have found as it did
evidence.

The respondent· is not

i~

bas~d

~equired

whi~h

they

no question that
on substantial

to prove that the

court must have found as it did, excluding··-any other! possible
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·'0.;~.

~ ~'

findings, in order to sustain the verdict.

The appellant,

on the other hand, must demonstrate that there was no
rational basis for the court's decision, no substantial
facts upon which the decision can be sustained, or that
the court acted arbitrarily and capriciously and clearly
erroneously.

The appellant has failed to demonstrate any

of these requisites.

The appellant's own brief admits that

the court could have found as it did, but also could have
found that the appellant's view of the facts was the accurate
view.

She takes great issue with the fact that the court

found two witnesses unreliable, but this is the court's
prerogative and any finder of fact's prerogative, and
cannot be overturned unless clearly erroneous.

The appellant

has failed to meet the burden required by this court to
reverse a trial court's findings and, as such, the appeal
should be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Judgments of the trial court will not be disturbed
unless clearly erroneous.

The trial court's findings must

be sustained if there is any rational basis for such findings
supported by substantial evidence.

In this case, the trial

court had a rational basis for its findings, which are
supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, its judgment
should be affirmed. ·
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

Respondent
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